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The Burden of Romanticism: Toward the New Poetry 
Roy Harvey Pearce 
TO THE MEMORY OF ERICH KAHLER, 1885-1970 
"Then look, I beg of you, try and 
look within yourselves rather than 
at me for what I shall discover." 
?William Carlos Williams, "Writer's Prologue to a Play in Verse' 
1 
The burden of Romanticism is one which we all bear, however uneasily. If we 
can 
say anything about the modern ego, we can say that it is romantic?to recall 
the tautological title of a book which Jacques Barzun published some years ago. 
We would not have thought of troubling ourselves so much about the modern 
ego if Romanticism hadn't discovered it for us, taught us that the sense of our 
selves we have when we face the fact that we are willy-nilly modern is pre 
cisely the burden it has placed upon us. Our egocentricism, even if we think of 
it as a too terribly refined version of Renaissance humanism, is at the heart of 
our power to have made the kind of world we have made?indeed, to have made 
ourselves in that world. Some day, we might have the kind of philosophical an 
thropology which will have absorbed the revelations of our philosophy, psycho 
analysis, anthropology, sociology, theory of history, and the like?absorbed those 
revelations 
sufficiently to tell us what we are, where we have come from and 
how far we have got, where we turned off the strait road (if we did), and how 
we 
might once more get back on it (if we wish to, if we can, if there is still 
time). ... I propose here a much more modest exercise: to look at the develop 
ing situation of poetry since the later eighteenth century; to focus particularly 
on the achievement of "modern" American poetry?that is, the work of those 
masters who came into their own between the two world wars; and then to 
inquire into the situation of the "new" poetry, "post-modern" poetry. In order 
to make such a survey manageable I shall make the substantial center of my 
concern poetics: which I take to be the theory of how poems should?not always 
do?work, and also of the ground of authority for their working. In all, I shall be 
concerned to assess the burden Romanticism has in changing but genetically 
related ways put upon the poetry on which it has put its stamp. This will be 
then, within a quite limited purview, an essay in history?or triangulation. 
It has been satisfactorily demonstrated, I think, that twentieth-century 
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poetics has been a version, a stage in the development of, romanticist poetics? 
this despite its so often tendentiously manifest anti-romanticism. For the sake 
of 
my argument, I must speak over-schematically, so to sharpen distinctions which 
are in 
actuality blurred but are nonetheless there. We can, then, ascribe to that 
development three stages: 
1. The change, beginning more-or-less toward the end of the eighteenth 
century, from a "mimetic to a creative conception of poetry"?the mimetic 
con 
ception being "no longer tenable when men ceased to share the cosmic designs 
that made mimesis 
meaningful." What 
was called for was the sort of poem 
which "would both formulate its own cosmic syntax and shape the autonomous 
poetic reality that the cosmic syntax permitted." (I quote and paraphrase some 
lines from Earl Wasserman's The Subtler Language.) Thus the poem as (in Mr. 
Wasserman's phrase) a "personal world-picture," a myth. Or (in Josephine Miles' 
phrase) as "the spirit's narrative . . . half-articulated and half-heard, but power 
ful in its force of implication." 
2. The development of a "symbolist" poetics?with its assumption of the 
isolated poet who gained from his isolation an insight into the need to fuse his 
world-picture into an image in which the word was one with the thing, and so 
not amenable to 
analysis into discursive terms?the poet's isolation putting him 
safely out of the reach of those who would demand of language that it be com 
monsensical or "scientific." The symbolist's faith was that his "personal world 
picture" was ultimately grounded in a system of extra-human correspondences, 
insight into which his genius gave him. 
3. The development of a modern, "post-symbolist" poetics, in which the 
symbolizing power of poetry is taken not only as carrying language beyond the 
purview of ordinary discourse, but as testing its authenticity as a means of get 
ting beyond, or pointing to something beyond, that purview. When the guaran 
tor of the 
correspondence of symbolic structures was taken to be the poet, then 
perforce the heart of poetry?the essence of poetry?was discovered to be lan 
guage, words as he could make them into his medium and his only. The out 
come of the development was this: that the highest test of language was taken 
to be its possible use in drawing a "personal world-picture," thus of comporting 
with the poet's archetypal sense of himself as being, before anything else, a 
person. Au fond, one's sense of oneself as a person, the argument went, derived 
from the certitude that one had no direct access to the things, or persons, of the 
world; one had only words. Since one wanted more, one had to want more, the 
question was: How might language be made to transcend language? Or: How 
might man break out of the confines of language and see what he must see? 
To sum up my summing-up: The three stages may be described as hav 
ing as their central concerns: 1. myth; 2. symbol; 3. language. In actuality, of 
course, the three concerns?with myth, symbol and language?have been from 
the beginning all integrally part of romanticist poetics. Moreover, they are stead 
ily marked, as A. O. Lovejoy some time ago pointed out in his The Reason, the 
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Understanding, and Time, by a wholesale delivery of the tasks (especially the 
epistemological tasks) of philosophy over to poetry?a process which began in 
immediately post-Kantian (i.e., "romantic") philosophy and culminated in the 
work of Bergson. So that T. E. Hulme's celebrated inauguration, in the 
name 
of Bergson, of an anti-romanticist poetics 
was a surrender 
camouflaged 
as a vic 
tory. Thus the whirlygigs of logic. My point is that in poetics, and accordingly in 
the practice of poetry, the focus of concern shifts, and at any one stage all three 
concerns tend to be subsumed under one, that at each of the later stages it is felt 
?and accordingly acted upon in the making of poems?that the preceding foci 
of concern have been accommodated to the present ones. We are now, I sus 
pect, overpoweringly 
aware of the three concerns as 
comprising at once 
an evo 
lutionary sequence and an increasingly integrated, perhaps self-identical, group, 
because we have come to the end of the line whose progress they mark and, 
confronted by the new poetry, wonder where we go, or will be taken, next. 
We so much honor Freud as a central figure in "modernism," 
it oc 
curs to me, because he tried to find a way of proving that actually the concern 
with myth was only a confused concern with symbol, the concern with symbol 
only a confused concern with language, and the concern with language in fact 
only an acceptance?at long last?of the "reality" of the core of 
our lives day-to 
day (and night-to-night) : consciousness and the price it demands of us and 
the rewards it offers. Human dignity, Freud discovered, was (or could be) a 
product of consciousness?such awareness of one's own history 
as would, at 
least in part, free man from being made by it, so that he could make it. With 
such knowledge we might put into language the record of our learning to live 
first with ourselves and then with one another. The record, in poetry, would be 
the act; the meaning, the being. It would be one of the tragic triumphs of con 
sciousness, realizing its fullest?withal limited?capacities for expression and 
crea 
tion; and in doing so, literally, linguistically, discovering its own worth. 
Freud's achievement surely has something to do with 
a curious fact? 
that, for all the modern poet's announced concern for myth and symbol, he 
found it increasingly difficult to construct his articles of poetic faith out of them. 
As is shown by any close and chronologically systematic reading of his poems 
and his characteristic meditations on poetry, he tried myth and symbol, found 
them not quite enough and 
came to treat them as means, not ends (or ends-in 
beginnings and beginnings-in-ends ). This surely is a case where ontogeny re 
capitulates phylogeny. Herein, functioning as critic, he set the direction for all 
non-poets who would be critics too. This, I take it, was, and is, 
an 
aspect of his 
status as culture hero, of his (when he was at his best) heroic honesty. So that 
he drove himself to seek the grounds of myth and symbol?first by searching for 
their nature in the workings of the psyche, second by searching for their expres 
sive forms. With the first, he studied "sensibility"; with the second, he studied 
"language." And inevitably the first was absorbed into the second, of which it is 
that special aspect which is of particular interest to poets and their exegetes. 
Now, the movement in history from the first stage to the second and 
from the second to the third has been abundantly studied. I need only recall 
books by Meyer Abrams, W. J. Bate, Mark Schorer, Josephine Miles, Earl Was 
serman, Edmund Wilson, Murray Krieger, Frank Kermode, Robert Langbaum, 
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Joseph Chiari, and Richard Foster?not to mention a plentitude of essays?to in 
dicate how widespread has been the discovery that from the later eighteenth 
century to our own time, the theory of poetry, whatever its makers may have 
said to the contrary, tends to be solidly romanticist. I wish here to attend to 
some 
aspects of the third, the twentieth-century, the modern, stage?then to in 
quire into its affiliations not only with what preceded but with what has fol 
lowed it. 
To do so, I must begin with some cautionary remarks. I must point 
out that, although we have established as fact the continuity of romanticist poetics 
into our own time, we cannot thereby read our twentieth-century "romantics" 
exactly as we read our nineteenth-century "romantics". I say this, because there 
has been some abortive effort at this 
self-defeating enterprise?curiously enough, 
by scholar-critics of Romanticism who somehow forget the prime definition of 
their field of interest: that it entails, as Professor Lovejoy long ago pointed out, 
an essential diversitarianism; which means that what is interesting and valuable 
in a poem, even if the poem be presumably grounded in some "universal," is 
interesting and valuable precisely as the poem is different from other poems?a 
concretely differentiated universal, so to speak. 
The diversitarian hope, put at its most general, is expressed in these 
words of the sociologist George Simmel, in a discussion of the achievement of 
nineteenth-century thought: 
I should like to think that the efforts of mankind will produce ever 
more numerous and varied forms wherein the human personality may 
affirm itself and demonstrate the value of its existence. In fortunate 
periods, these varied forms may order themselves into harmonious 
wholes. In doing so, their contradictions and conflicts will cease to 
be mere obstacles to mankind's efforts; they will also stimulate new 
demonstrations of the 
strength of these efforts and lead them to new 
creations. 
Simmel's words (they come from his Fundamental Problems of Sociology, 1917) 
may now seem to us Utopian; perhaps they seemed so to him. Romanticism did 
not in modernism come into its fortunate period. Which is to say that Western 
culture did not come into its fortunate period. The achievement of our great 
modernists was to affirm themselves and to demonstrate the value of their own 
existence?not to affirm their readers and to demonstrate the value of their exis 
tence: 
except potentially, as it were. This is an aspect of that overriding aliena 
tion which we take to have been (and to continue to be) the great malaise of 
modern man. Indeed, it was the modern poet's burden to express the symptoms, 
to teach his readers to discover them in themselves. His diversitarian hope was 
that as his readers discovered the symptoms, they would learn to survive them, 
and to be the better for it. For in the malaise, he knew, lay the ground of its 
own cure. Understanding it, his readers would know what it might mean not to 
be alienated?their relations to one another, as Emerson had said in 
"Experi 
ence," being casual and oblique. For the poet, the malaise was one of the sensi 
bility; it was characterized by a failure in the sense of community?which made 
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for a failure in the power to communicate. His language had not failed man. 
Rather, he had failed his language. He had failed to comprehend the power it 
gave him and also the responsibility possession of such power put upon him. He 
had failed to see in his use of language 
a 
prime means to the ever more numerous 
and varied forms wherein the human personality might affirm itself and demon 
strate the value of its existence. 
But perhaps he had not failed entirely. Perhaps he had only been 
timid, unwilling. Yet perhaps he had forestalled failure by recognizing its threat, 
its challenge. And in this forestalling the modern poets (romantic, romanticist, 
neo-romantic) were his leaders. The lesson which their practice?often enough 
as 
opposed to their preachment?taught is this : 
Human creativeness in art prevents the recognized varieties of feel 
ing, and established conceptions of the mind, from ever hardening 
into a final pattern. There are always surprises, the identification of 
new attitudes and states of mind through freely invented works of 
art that seem an exact expression of them for the first time. Any 
closed morality, so far left to itself, is always threatened with this 
unpredicted shock and disturbance, which suddenly illumines another 
possibility of human feeling and desire through the invention of a 
new form of expression. . . The idea of original art is the idea of 
an achievement that goes beyond any previous intention, and that 
must 
always be to some degree unexpected 
even by its maker. Even 
the most confident moralist must know that, sheltered within his own 
framework of thought, there are many potentially interesting features 
of behaviour and of feeling which he has not the means to notice. 
At some time they may be brought to the surface and, through the 
invention of forms of expression, recognised for the first time. If he 
reflects, he will acknowledge that these possible revelations must be 
infinitely many. 
These are the words, not of a "neo-Kantian" like Simmel, but of a "Humean"? 
the "Oxford philosopher," Stuart Hampshire in his Thought and Action (1959). 
I quote them not only because they serve to move my argument from a consid 
eration of the diversitarian in general to the diversitarian in particular?in art? 
but because they may serve to indicate how the diversitarian faith still uni 
versally possesses us. For it characterizes the world which men have together 
struggled to make during the last two centuries. We quarrel?a Simmel would 
quarrel with a Hampshire, a Stevens quarreled with an Eliot, a Williams quar 
reled with them both?not about the diversitarian faith but in terms of it. 
Thus it was in the nature of the modern poet's vocation, 
as that "anti 
romantic" Ezra Pound had it, that he must again and again "make it new." The 
notion that twentieth-century Romanticism is sufficiently comprehended by re 
ferring it back to nineteenth-century Romanticism?this notion derives from 
what I should call a 
"spurious" conception of romanticism, in order to set it 
against a more tenable conception, centering 
on the idea of the "diversitarian," 
which I should call 
"genuine." (I borrow the terms, from Edward Sapir's great 
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essay "Culture: Genuine and Spurious.") Wallace Stevens, a "Romantic" in terms 
of both consciously held-to-doctrine and practice in poetry, put the matter thus 
in one of his posthumously published Adagia : 
It should be said of poetry that it is essentially romantic as if one 
were 
recognizing the truth about poetry for the first time. Although 
the romantic is referred to, most often, in a pejorative sense, this 
sense attaches, or should attach, not to the romantic in general but 
to some phase of the romantic that has become stale. Just 
as there 
is 
always a romantic that is potent, so there is always a romantic 
that is impotent. 
Genuine Romanticism and spurious; fresh Romanticism and stale; po 
tent Romanticism and impotent. To discriminate between the one and the other: 
this perhaps is the historian's real problem. One of the ironies of the history of 
modernist poetry surely is that poets like Pound and Eliot, the Southern Fugi 
tives, and many of their epigones in the 1940's and 50's?all preached against an 
impotent Romanticism, a stale Romanticism, a spurious Romanticism, 
on behalf 
of one potent, fresh, and genuine; and claimed thereby to be anti-romantics, 
even "classicists." The irony, however, is only superficial, and is contained by 
the fact that the history of literary Romanticism, and other kinds too, is the 
history of the discovery of the potency of the diverse?if I may make so bold as 
to combine the language of a Stevens and a Lovejoy. Or: to think of that his 
tory in terms of the making of poems?it is the history of a seeking of a means, 
an authoritative medium, whereby to evoke the potency of the diverse. Modern 
ism?the third stage in the development of Romanticist poetics?centered not on 
myth or symbol but on language. I think if we get clear the burden of under 
standing put upon us by the modernist obsession with language, we shall be in 
a 
position to comprehend?at least tentatively?the burden of understanding put 
upon us by the new poetry, and to begin to elucidate its particular obsession, thus 
its poetics. 
I quote from three well-known statements about poetry by modern 
poets. From T. S. Eliot's "The Social Function of Poetry": 
We may say that the duty of a poet, is only indirectly to his people; 
his direct duty is to his language, first to preserve, and second to 
extend and improve. In expressing what other people feel he is also 
changing the feeling by making it more conscious; he is making 
people more aware of what they feel already, and therefore teaching 
them 
something about themselves. 
From Wallace Stevens' "The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words": 
The deepening need for words to express our thoughts and feelings 
which, we are sure, are all the truth that we shall ever experience, 
having no illusions, makes 
us listen to words when we hear them, 
loving them and feeling them, makes 
us search the sound of them, 
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for a finality, a perfection, 
an unalterable vibration, which it is only 
within the power of the acutest poet to give them. Those of us who 
may have been thinking of the path of poetry, those who understand 
that words are thoughts and not only our own thoughts but the 
thoughts of men and women ignorant of what it is that they are 
thinking, must be conscious of this: that, above everything else, 
poetry is words 
.... 
From William Carlos Williams' Introduction to The Wedge: 
A poem is a small (or large) machine made out of words. . . . When 
a man makes a poem, makes it, mind you, he takes words as he finds 
them interrelated about him and composes them?without distortion 
which would mark their exact 
significances?into an intense expression 
of his perceptions and ardors that they may constitute a revelation 
in the 
speech that he uses 
. . . There is no poetry of distinction with 
out formal invention, for it is in the intimate form that works of art 
achieve their exact 
meaning, in which they most resemble the ma 
chine, to give language its highest dignity, its illumination in the 
environment to which it is native. 
Now, it is a mere truism to say that poets have always been 
con 
cerned with words, with language. But this 
concern has been?or was, say, be 
fore the latter part of the eighteenth century?a concern subsidiary to 
a 
larger 
concern: at one extreme, to celebrate in all its rich humanity, and at the other, 
to denigrate in all its vacuous inhumanity, the ways of men and their gods. (To 
denigrate is to celebrate inversely, out of a sense of what could or should have 
been.) The history of literary Romanticism is the history of the gradual meta 
morphosis of the major concern into the subsidiary, as increasingly that which 
was to be celebrated?the ways of men and their gods?became not 
an assured 
reality, locatable in time and space, anchored in a question-transcending faith, 
but first a matter of 
myth, then a matter of symbol, then a matter of language. 
Those whom this development made unhappy would have said something like 
"mere" 
myth, or symbol, or language. Poets have striven to prove that it is not 
a 
question of "mere" myth, or symbol, or language; that in man's increasing dis 
covery of the potentiality of his humanity as humanity, understanding the power 
of 
myth, or symbol, or language is a sufficient and necessary condition for what 
ever celebration in art the nature of man allows. 
I would characterize the great achievement of modernist poetry, that of 
the dominating sensibility through World War II, thus: The poet would still 
celebrate the ways of men and their gods; the testimony of the poems of those 
writers I have cited is sufficient proof of this. But first he had to celebrate (or 
denigrate, I repeat), and so enlarge the potential for, man and the ways of man 
with language, and likewise language and the ways of language with men. 
Where once the poet could say "proper words in proper places," now he had to 
say "What words in what places?" Or: "We have words, but no places to put them 
in; we must make places to put them in." The poet could not simply assume his 
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essential humanity; now he was bound to prove it; prove it linguistically; prove 
that men were men precisely as they at once used language and were used by 
it. The traditional function of poetry had been, through its linguistic transforma 
tions, to enhance, deepen, and enlarge man's vision of his world and himself in 
it. Now that function was to make such a vision possible. The vision 
was not to 
be attained until after, through his creation of a poetic experience, the poet could 
not only make us grant the possibility of the vision but also invent for us the 
ways of realizing it. Words communicate, the implicit argument went, because 
they are not only the poet's but the reader's; yet only the poet can tell us what 
they really mean, how their meaning may be released so that we will all know 
what they really mean. The great make-believe of most modern poetry was that 
the reader was 
composing the poem along with the poet. But then: It turned out 
not to be 
entirely make-believe. For the reader turned out to have been learning 
that it was possible, in spite of all the forces which tended to disintegrate and 
to reduce the languages which might hold modern communities together, not 
only to find words but the proper places for them, to use language as a means 
of 
realizing oneself 
as a man?a man 
perhaps capable even of having gods. (Let 
me propose schematically that in the history of romanticist poetics through mod 
ernism we get this evolving set of oppositions against the forces which disinte 
grate and reduce man's capacity to make poems: against mechanistic rationalism, 
the poetics of myth; against positivistic scientism, the poetics of the symbol; 
against behaviorism and mass communications, the poetics of language.) 
Thus it would seem that the characteristic modern poem had as its in 
tention not 
only registering its substantial concerns but attaining the state, 
through its working, of 
an ars po?tica. (I would here cite as evidence not only 
of the substance but the mode of Four Quartets, the Cantos, Paterson, The 
Bridge, and Notes toward a Supreme Fiction, to name only the principal master 
works in this vein.) The poetics of Romanticism had in the twentieth century 
come to be a poetics wherein, to quote some words of I. A. Richards (from his 
Speculative Instruments), poetry might well be defined as "words so used that 
their 
meanings are free to dispose themselves; to make up together whatever 
they can." Needless to say, perhaps, only a poet could thus free words; and free 
ing them, he put to a specifically linguistic test whatever doctrines they might 
project, perhaps transformed those doctrines in the testing and projecting. 
Here we come 
up against the crucial problem in the modernist version 
of the romantic theory of poetry. What does it mean to impute agency to words 
?to say that, freed, as they can be only in poems, they can act freely? Surely 
this theory of poetry entails a richer and more inclusive linguistics than any we 
have even now; and surely Richards' statement (which he inevitably made the 
substance of poems) is one which relates the practice of modernist poetry to the 
contemporaneous practice of philosophy, theology, anthropology, psychology, and 
the rest?all concerned to understand the 
meaning of meaning, to preserve against 
all onslaughts the capacity of language to be meaningful. Here the concerns of 
modernist poetry lay the groundwork for the concerns of "post-modern" poetry. 
How?to recall Eliot's words?does a poet "extend and improve" language? Why 
?to recall Stevens' words?is it that the poet can best satisfy our "deepening need 
for words?" How?to recall Williams' words?can a poet "compose" words "as he 
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finds them interrelated about him" and yet not "distort" them? What is the con 
cept of the meaning of meaning entailed here? What, in short, is the relation 
between the poetic use of language and the health of the sensibility, between 
the poetic use of language and the situation of modern and post-modern 
man 
wherein consciousness of self has become self-consciousness? On what grounds 
in linguistic theory, not to say ontology and metaphysics, may we place our 
faith in poetry? Such are some of the issues still raised by modern poetics and 
the poetry out of which it issues. 
Poets, on this argument, had become the unacknowledged grammarians 
of mankind, all the while hoping to be more; but knowing all the while that if 
they were not this, they were nothing. Romanticism, then, 
as it issued into twen 
tieth-century poetry, had not necessarily relieved man of the burden of ortho 
doxy, original sin, history?as has so often been claimed. Nor had it necessarily 
supplied man with a religion of art to take their place. For these are matters of 
doctrine; and I am persuaded that one of the lessons to be learned from the his 
tory of Romanticism is that its central tenet?the potency of the diverse?tran 
scends doctrines, is a means, an absolute, of testing and judging doctrines, which 
are relative. So that matters of doctrine 
comprise a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition in the practice of most of our great modern poets and may be 
as 
sented to or denied 
accordingly?the assent or the denial having no necessary 
relationship to our estimate of the achievement and value of the poets. The suf 
ficient condition of the practice of poetry is a concern with the viability in lan 
guage of matters of doctrine as they do and do not manifest the potency of the 
diverse. Modern poetics, a romanticist poetics, thus considered, meant not to 
teach man what to believe. Rather, it wanted to teach him how to believe, the 
necessary conditions of belief. It instructed him that he could comprehend, and 
so properly assume, the burden of any doctrine only if he could conceive of it 
as 
uniquely, humanly, his own; only if it did not violate his sense of the potency 
of the diverse; only if he could find the right words for it; only if it would be 
amenable to poetic expression, so as to be claimable as his own. We don't have 
to believe a poem, he could say; we have only to believe in it. 
No modern poet of worth, not even an ostentive romantic?wanted to 
have his 
religion split?to recall some cruelly influential, but mistaken, words 
from T. E. Hulme's "classic" summa contra Romanticism. The modern masters 
wanted just to be sure that it was really theirs; that they could put it into words 
which 
comported with their sense of themselves as persons first and wanderers 
lonely as a crowd second; that, whatever else it might require of them, it would 
answer to their sense of the potency of the diverse. For they declared that in 
the potency of the diverse, for them above all latent in the use of language, lay 
their hope for the dignity not only of man, but of men: their romantic humanism. 
This is what they surely have taught the poets who have come after them, the 
newest poets. For out of the poetics of language, out of the poetics of myth and 
symbol, there has risen, there is rising, a new, or renewed, poetics?one of state 
ment and, more important, of dialogue. (Which is to say, too long after the fact, 
that modern, post-symbolist poetics was, for well and for ill, 
a 




Are our recent poets (acting, I must emphasize, on our behalf; acting out our 
struggles to educate ourselves) learning the lesson of their modern masters? I 
think 
so?although at this stage I am not altogether clear, because they are not, 
as to 
exactly what the lesson is and what, once learned, it will involve. (One 
never 
really knows what the lesson is until he has learned it; and then it is part 
of the sort of history I am sketching now. ) We can, as always when dealing with 
the contemporaneous, mark out "tendencies." I think that it is reasonably clear 
that in this 
"post-modern" era we are being moved into 
a new 
stage in the his 
tory of romanticist poetics, therefore a new stage in the history of ourselves. In 
the newer poetry?so it seems to me?the sense of an authentic language, authen 
tically used, is somehow strong enough to let poets conceive of themselves as 
living out their imagined lives in a world whose "public" aspect, however threat 
ening, is not such as to threaten the very existence of poetry itself. It is as though 
poetry had come through its post-Renaissance phase sufficiently strengthened in 
ego power to be now capable of putting myth, symbol, and even language where 
they properly belong?in human space and history, not outside of it; as though 
poetry were once more capable of being poetry, mere poetry; as though it were 
once more 
ready to stake out its own claim as being 
a central means 
whereby 
man makes not himself but his knowledge of himself; as though "man" as sub 
ject were being rediscovered in "reality" as object and vice-versa?so that the 
subject-object distinction at the heart of romanticist poetics were being dis 
solved. Accepting the sheer factuality, the sheer giveness, of the human condi 
tion, recent poets seem to me to have on the whole ceased trying to explain the 
world and started to try to know it; and they strive to master, as against being 
mastered by, implicit principles of explanation (myths, symbols, even their own 
kind of linguistics). That is, they try to "use" (because they will not be "used 
by") myth and symbol, and try also to develop the kind of language which, as 
language should, points beyond itself, even takes the poet beyond himself: from 
his sense of man?as the power of language, being a power of consciousness, may 
transform it?into a sense of men. 
A poet like W. D. Snodgrass may remind us at times of Auden, at 
times of Stevens, at times of many others of his immediate modernist forebears; 
but he seems to be trying to develop the means whereby he may make state 
ments not about 
making statements but about objects or events whose import is 
worth discovering and so stating, not about the experience of poetry and its 
ground but about an experience through poetry and its "significance": 
These trees stand very tall under the heavens. 
While they stand, if I walk, all stars traverse 
This steep celestial gulf their branches chart. 
Though lovers stand at sixes and at sevens 
While civilizations come down with the curse, 
Snodgrass is walking through the universe. 
I can't make any world go around your house. 
But note this moon. Recall how the 
night nurse 
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Goes ward-rounds, by the mild, reflective art 
Of focusing her flashlight on her blouse. 
Your name's safe conduct into love or verse; 
Snodgrass is walking through the universe. 
Your name's absurd, miraculous as sperm 
And as decisive. If you can't coerce 
One thing outside yourself, why you're the poet! 
What irrefrangible atoms whirl, affirm 
Their destiny and form Lucinda's skirts! 
She can't make up your mind. Soon as you know it, 
Your firmament grows touchable and firm. 
If all this world runs battlefield or worse, 
Come, let us wipe our glasses on our shirts: 
Snodgrass is walking through the universe. 
("These Trees Stand . . .") 
This just may border on the trivial; the poet may just be using his capacity as 
poet to defend himself and his readers against the situation of which he treats. 
Snodgrass and his kind may turn out to have been the Longfellows of our age, 
as, at the other extreme a poet like Gregory Corso and his kind, trying to make 
new the language of all the "mad" poets from Smart and Blake to Rimbaud and 
Artuad may turn out to have been the Lindsays : 
On the steps of the brightmadhouse 
I hear the bearded knell shaking down the woodlawn 
the final knell of my world 
I climb and enter a fiery gathering of knights 
they unaware of my presence lay forth sheepskin plans 
and with mailcoated fingers trace my arrival 
back back when on the black steps of Nero lyre Rome I 
stood 
in my arms the wailing philosopher 
the final call of mad history 
Now my presence is known 
my arrival marked by illuminated stains 
The great windows of Paradise open 
Down to radiant dust falls the curtains of Past Time 
in flocks of multicolored birds 
Light winged light O the wonder of light 
Time takes me by the hand 
born March 26 1930 I am led 100 mph o'er the vast market of 
choice 
what to choose? What to choose? 
Oh?and I leave my orange room of myth 
no chance to lock away my toys of Zeus 
I choose the room of Bleecker Street 
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A baby mother stuffs my mouth with a pale Milanese breast 
I suck I struggle I cry O Olympian mother 
unfamiliar this breast to me 
Snows 
Decade of icy asphalt doomed horses 
Weak dreams Dark corridors of P.S. 42 Roofs Ratthroated 
pigeons 
Led 100 mph over those all too real Mafia streets 
profanely I shed my Hermean wings 
0 time be merciful 
throw me beneath your humanity of cars 
feed me to giant grey skyscrapers 
exhaust my heart to your bridges 
1 discard my lyre of Orphic futility 
And for such betrayal I climb these bright mad steps 
and enter this room of paradisaical light 
emphemeral 
Time 
a long long dog having chased its orbited tail 
comes to grab my hand 
and leads me into conditional life 
("In the Fleeting Hand of Time") 
The poems I have quoted run the risks of their makers' romantic hu 
manism. So does this one by James Wright?which, since it must be political, re 
fuses to be 
obliquely or ironically so : 
In the Shreve High football stadium, 
I think of polacks nursing long beers in Til tons ville, 
And gray faces of Negroes in the blast furnace at Benwood, 
And the ruptured night-watchman of Wheeling Steel, 
Dreaming of heroes. 
All the proud fathers are ashamed to go home. 
Their women cluck like starved pullets, 
Dying for love. 
Therefore, 
Their sons grow suicidally beautiful 
At the beginning of October, 
And gallop terribly against each other's bodies. 
("Autumn Begins in Martins Ferry, Ohio") 
And so does this one, by Gary Snyder?which, since it will confront the natural 
world, will strive to penetrate and be penetrated by it: 
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Pressure of sun on the rockslide 
Whirled me in dizzy hop-and-step descent, 
Pools of pebbles buzzed in a Juniper shadow, 
Tiny tongues of a this-year rattlesnake flicked, 
I leaped, laughing for little boulder-colour coil 
Pounded by heat raced down the slabs to the creek 
Deep tumbling under arching walls and stuck 
Whole head and shoulders in the water: 
Stretched full on cobble?ears roaring 
Eyes open aching from the cold and faced a trout. 
("Water") 
What strikes me about these poems in contrast to those of their modernist fore 
bears is how carefully they trace out the contours of the experience they would 
tell us of, so carefully as to make it possibly ours. Even if they would choose 
to make out Williams (and also Pound as he resembles Williams) as their par 
ticular master, even if they take themselves to be realizing Williams' concern 
to create a poem of projective sympathy, they go beyond Williams. Their fore 
bears?Williams among them?characteristically fractured or shattered their ex 
periences and then reconstellated them according to principles dictated by a 
concern to discover if language could admit them into the sensibility. The poems 
I have quoted?two by men deliberately putting themselves on a leash, two by 
men as deliberately running wild?"do" whereas those of their forebears "are." 
The deliberateness is all, perhaps when it should be just enough. 
The deliberateness is a product of a deeply felt dialogic relationship 
with the reader. The mode of control, poem-to-poem, varies enormously, but the 
end is pretty much the same: to share with, not to talk to, the reader. 
John Ashberry makes flat factuality generate a surreal world, almost a 
world of fantasy but not quite. He will make the familiar unfamiliar, so in the 
process to know it for what it really, humanly, is: 
I write, trying to economize 
These lines, tingling. The very earth's 
A pension. My life story 
I am toying with the idea. 
I'm perfectly capable (signature) 
The kerosene white branches the stadium 
There is no reason to be cold 
Underneath, it is calm today. 
For the moment, clement day 
Observes our transactions with kindly eye. 
There is no reason to suppose 
Anything of the kind will occur. 
I oppose with all the forces of my will 
Your declaration. You are right 
To do so. The street catches auburn 
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Reflections, the start is here. 
You may have been well. 
You limit me to what I say. 
The sense of words is 
With a backward motion, pinning me 
To the daylight mode of my declaration. 
But ah, night may not tell 
The source! I feel well 
Under the dinner table. He is playing a game 
With me, about credits. 
I have to check in the hall 
About 
something. 
The invitation arrived 
On the appointed day. 
By nightfall he and I were between. 
The street rages with toil. 
Can you let yourself, a moment, put down your work? 
(from "Measles") 
Richard Brautigan will push the delights of complicit simple-mindedness all the 
way: 
I sit here dreaming 
long thoughts of California 
at the end of a November day 
below a cloudy twilight 
near the Pacific 
listening to The Mamas and The Papas 
THEY'RE GREAT 
singing a song about breaking 
somebody's heart and digging it! 
I think I'll get up 
and dance around the room. 
Here I go! 
("Our Beautiful West Coast Thing") 
David Ignatow will annotate with maximum precision a brief encounter and in 
the same breath (the poem moves that way) make explicit its implications. The 
poet's business is no longer a matter of what Eliot called hints and guesses: 
Say pardon to a bum, 
brushing past him. 
He could lean back 
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and spit 
and you would have to wipe it off. 
How would you explain 
that you have insulted 
this man's identity, 
of his own choosing; 
and others could only scratch 
their heads and advise you 
to move on 
and be quiet. 
Say pardon 
and follow your own will 
in the open spaces ahead. 
("Say Pardon") 
And Robert Duncan wills himself to be prophetic; the will powers his poem to its 
openly cosmic end. Still, the poet faces up to the fact of his limitations, which 
are his reader's: 
Grand Mother of Images, matrix 
genetrix, quickening in rays 
from the first days of the cosmos, 
turning my poet's mind in tides of 
solitude, seductive reveries, fears, resolves, outrage 
yet 
having this certain specific agent I am, 
the shadow of a tree wavering and yet staying 
deep in it, 
the certain number of days rendered uncertain, 
gathering, 
animal and mammal, drawing such milk 
from the mother of stars. 
(from "In the Place of A Passage 22") 
I have instanced here the work of eight of the "new" poets. Although 
it avoids classification by schools, peer-groups, manifestos, influences, and the 
like, the selection is not quite at random. These are, simply enough, some of 
the new poets whose work I find?in differing degrees, to be sure?compelling. 
"CompelHng" may be too strong a word. I mean just that these are some of the 
new poets whose work I find myself altogether willing to make part of my own 
proprioception. 
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"Proprioception"?the word comes out of psychology?is 
a central con 
cept in the new poetry, at least for what two poets have made it out to mean. 
Speaking of his work and that of his peers, Snodgrass said in May 1962 (his 
words are reported in a 1963 pamphlet, Approaches to the Study of Twentieth 
Century Literature) : 
We are like the Greeks in this: being great explorers of physical 
space, they were obsessed with the problem of "limit." How far 
can 
you go, they asked, practically and morally? 
The problem of limit, too, encompasses certain psychological 
problems, especially that of proprioception: the recognition of the 
self as an object positioned in space relative to other objects posi 
tioned in space; or, the self as a subject positioned in space relative 
to other 
subjects. But this space must be seen as endless; we must 
see ourselves as finite dancers on a 
stage, not infinite, but undefined. 
This absence of definition gives us a chance to move fully into that 
relativism proposed so long ago by men like Giordano Bruno, but 
which so few have dared to 
explore 
.... 
In a coincidence happy for the historian, Charles Olson, a poet who is centrally 
concerned with "the problem of 'limit,' 
" 
was 
writing, also in May 1962, a vatic 
manifesto (published in 1965) called Proprioception: 
The advantage is to "place" the thing, instead of it wallowing around 
sort of outside, in the universe, like, when the experience of it is 
interoceptive : it is inside us/ & at the same time does not feel literal 
ly identical with our own physical or mortal self (the part that can 
die). In this sense likewise the heart, etc, the small intestine etc, are 
or can be felt as?and literally they can be?transferred. Or substi 
tuted for. Etc. The organs.?Probably also why the old psychology 
was 
chiefly visceral: neither dream, nor the unconscious, was then 
known as such. Or 
allowably inside, like. 
". . . limits/are what any of us/ are inside of." Olson writes in the fifth of his 
Maximus Poems. But inside those limits of human space and time, there are 
available the means of achieving definition through relationship and dialogue, 
subject to subject. I do not mean here to avoid the issue of the degree to which 
in their work two poets like Snodgrass and Olson differ. I mean only to indicate 
how?in their concern to define relationship and dialogue as those of subject to 
subject, not subject to object?they conceive alike of the vocation of the new 
poet. 
And (since in matters of this importance, one must be quite blunt) I 
would not deny the dangers of the new poets' way. For striving toward the 
subject-to-subject relationship, validating the proprioceptive mode, can be an act 
so strained and desperate as to lead first to the homogenization and then to the 
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annihilation of the sensibility. Expanding the definition of "man," exploring the 
definition to the utmost?this can lead to an act of suicide 
mistakenly made out 
to be a rite of passage. Love of the other may become a totally sentimental, 
bathetic, confused indulgence of self, and there might be generated a sense of the 
world in which polymorphism reigns over all. Thus Michael McClure: 
OH BRIGHT OH BLACK SINGBEAST LOVEBEAST CATKIN SLEEK 
spined and gullet shaped. Free me 
in the tree-lighted evening and full cool 
morning. OH 
VISION free me erect and huge to VISION 
DEEP-DELVED 
OUTDELVING. BANNER 
hung and warm warmly gestured 
star gestured in 
the coldness. 
Fingers spread pointing. 
The 
only vision sight-sense. 
The 
appropriate gloss can only be these opening lines from McClure's 
"Reflections after a Poem" (the poem being his translation of Nerval's "Black 
Spot"): 
LET US THROW OUT THE WORD MAN! Such poems as this 
translation of Nerval remind me that I am a MAMMAL! We have 
almost worn out the word man. This is the young creature looking into 
the world. The poem makes me see the surge of life. The word MAN 
is not romantic 
enough! 
. . . 
Thus one extreme 
example?one phase of the new poetry as it projects 
itself out of the proprioceptive orbit into absurdity. (The old romanticist rule 
still holds: Everything ventured, nothing gained.) But even as we are aware 
of this danger, this risk, unwisely and unintelligently (that is the key word!) 
courted, we must remember that it will in the long run be the orbit that matters. 
It is that orbit which I have been trying to trace in this essay?that orbit, and 
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as I have said, the sense of the new poet's vocation which it defines, the poetics 
which it articulates. Within this poetics are the facts of our case as the new 
poetry lets us confront them. 
Moreover, if we were to look at the later work of poets a gen 
eration or so older, poets "transitional" between the "modern" and the "new"? 
Berryman, Shapiro, Lowell, Warren, Schwartz, Roethke, for example?we would 
find 
analogous "proprioceptive" qualities and conditions: 
a 
turning to narrative 
forms, explicit or implicit; 
an 
attending to states of consciousness 
as they are 
implicated in action; an increasing sense of inter- (as opposed to intra-) personal 
relations; an exploding diversity, 
a sometimes awkward honesty, a directness, an 
openness; a search for the face behind the persona. We would perhaps be surer 
of this poetry than of that I have quoted. But the aim of this essay is to suggest 
how, even as we reconsider briefly that of which we may be fairly sure, we may 
try out unsureness. Secure in the history our poets have made, we may well risk 
being insecure in the history they are making. Nonetheless, the qualities and 
con 
ditions I have noted are there, in older poets and younger. And the reader is no 
longer a hypocrite, peeping over the poet's shoulder, hoping against hope not 
to have to acknowledge that he is the poet's double, his brother?but one whom 
the poet would encounter, with whom he would initiate a dialogue. Language 
becomes a medium for as well as a medium in. Myth and symbol are parts of the 
poet's vocabulary, not its formal, much less final, cause. 
It is, then, as part of their essential heritage from Romanticism that 
poets of the generation of Eliot, Stevens, and Williams, 
our great "Moderns," 
took upon themselves the obligation to preserve, refine, and extend our language. 
Their destiny was to teach poets of following generations to use it in such a way 
that they, or their progeny, might one day be audible witnesses to that great 
romantic vision: the transformation of the humanism of the one into the human 
ism of the many. And just at the point in history when the material conditions 
of life may, at their level, make this transformation possible, such conditions 
bring to bear a power for dehumanization which might as well make it impossible 
on other, higher levels. It will be possible, of course, only if a power for humani 
zation is brought to bear. And the poet is ready, 
as in the nature of his relation 
to his society he is always ready. He has his language, which incorporates his 
understanding of symbol and myth and the ideas of order projected thereby. 
But he wants to discover and project his own idea of order, to walk through his 
own and his fellows' universe and to know the conditional life. For him symbol 
and 
myth can be no more than heuristic, although it is quite true that the evi 
dence of his work shows often that his poems know this better than he does. He 
senses that at some point he must shed his Hermean wings and discard his lyre of 
Orphic futility. He will make his firmament grow touchable and firm. He will 
declare quite flatly "therefore." He will make his dizzy hop-and-step descent. He 
will take the whole earth to be his pension. He will get up and dance around the 
room. He will say Pardon, so that he may follow his own will. He will seek his 
and his fellows' Grand Mother of Images. Language, he has been given to dis 
cover, is to talk with. And if talking about oneself is inevitable, still it is important 
not to talk only to oneself. Too, it is important to listen. 
126 
For the poet knows what his magus knows: ". 
. . that an individual life 
is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of his 
tory; and that for him all human integrity stands and falls with one style of in 
tegrity of which he partakes." The magus I quote is Erik Erikson?one psycho 
analyst who, in practice and theory, shows that he understands the sort of goal 
which, for all their strained deliberateness (a kind of reaction-formation?) the 
poems I have quoted point toward. This shouldn't surprise us, however. For 
psychoanalysis is the modern ego's best account of itself. And just as recent 
poetry has striven to initiate its true dialogue with the world, so has recent 
psychoanalysis. 
I have a sense that the poet would now use his language so 
as to hu 
manize?perhaps to make symbol and myth human, perhaps to discover that 
they are after all human and are therefore our means, in poetry and out, of dis 
covering and so accepting and enlarging our humanity. The poet is still the kind 
of Utopian we need, the Utopian of the present. He is the last romantic, as has 
been virtually every poet since the later eighteenth century at least. For he 
knows that it is in the nature of every phase of Romanticism that it be the "last," 
if its artists are 
continually to actualize the potency of the diverse. In art, the 
last shall always go first. 
Theodore Roethke, an older and probably a wiser poet than the ones I 
have so far quoted, called one of his books Praise to the End! The phrase, of course, 
is Wordsworth's; the passage is from The Prelude (I, 346-350). Taken out of its 
essentially symbolic, mythic context, so that it renders just Wordsworth's all too 
human sense of himself, it marks the tone and substance, the characteristic im 
port, not only of Roethke's poetry but that of many of his younger contempo 
raries, whose future was in his bones: 
. . . How 
strange, that all 
The terrors, pains, and early miseries, 
Regrets, vexations, lassitudes interfused 
Within my mind, should e'er have borne a part, 
And that a needful part, in making up 
The calm existence that is mind when I 
Am worthy of myself! Praise to the end! 
I have said that the passage is here quoted out of context. And I have 
shifted the context even more by speaking not of Roethke and his generation, 
but of the generation of Snodgrass, Corso, Wright, Snyder, Ashberry, Brautigan, 
Ignatow, Duncan, and (alas) McClure. But then, this is what Romanticism has done 
?steadily shifted modern man's context, until at last he can hope to be capable at 
once of finding a proper context and making it his own, of accepting no context un 
less he can in poems and all his creative endeavors know it as his own. It is of the 
essence of the latest phase of Romanticism that he should have discovered that 
his context is not his own unless it is his fellows', and not theirs unless it is his. 
Perhaps it will turn out to be God's?but surely not unless it is at least man's. At 
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least. And the terrors, pains, miseries, regrets, vexations, lassitudes are not only 
within man's mind but without. The boon of a calm existence must be not only 
his but his 
community's. We have been true enough to the burden Romanticism 
has put upon us to have invented?that is, at once discovered and created?a 
poetics of dialogue. The poet speaks, 
so to be 
spoken to, so to speak again 
. . . 
Praise to the end! 
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